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1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that the incentives of firms to invest in research and development
(R&D) are distorted because of the public good characteristic of new information. In particu-
lar, the appropriability problem has been widely discussed in the literature (cf. Spence, 1984,
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), which causes firms to underinvest in R&D because they can not
completely internalize the social returns of their private efforts in the presence of R&D spill-
overs. Three instruments are usually considered to restore the firms’ incentives to engage in
R&D: Tax policies and direct subsidies, ex-post R&D cooperation through patents and li-
censing, and ex-ante R&D cooperation (cf. Katz and Ordover, 1990). While the first two in-
struments require government intervention to determine taxes and subsidies or to strengthen
property rights, the third instrument is assumed to work through private incentives because of
the possibility to internalize R&D spillovers between cooperating firms
1.
 Other advantages of
R&D cooperation include the elimination of wasteful duplication of R&D efforts and the dis-
tribution of risk and fixed costs among participants (cf. Jacquemin, 1988).
Starting with the work by Katz (1986) and D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) a large
body of theoretical literature has emerged over the past decade trying to formalize firm’s pri-
vate incentives to engage in R&D cooperation by using oligopoly models which allow for
strategic interactions between firms.
2 Usually, two-stage games are analyzed in which firms
choose either noncooperatively or cooperatively their amount of R&D investment in the first
stage and compete on the product market in the second stage. If R&D spillovers are suffi-
ciently high this framework explains the private incentives for R&D cooperation between
rivals which leads to increased R&D investment, output and social welfare. While these mod-
els differ in many details (e.g., Bertrand vs. Cournot competition in the second stage), they
have in common that they focus on a single industry by analyzing intra-industry cooperation
between rivals on the product market.
This stands in contrast to the large amount of empirical literature searching for both intra-
and inter-industry R&D spillovers and claiming the particular importance of the latter for
productivity growth (e.g. Griliches and Lichtenberg, 1984, and references cited in Capron et
al., 1996). Descriptive evidence of R&D cooperation between sectors and within sectors re-
                                                
1 Nevertheless, in many counties R&D cooperation is now explicitly supported by antitrust policy (for the EC,
cf. Jacquemin, 1988, and Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1997).
2  Examples include De Bondt and Veugelers (1991), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Vonortas (1994),
Ziss (1994), Salant and Shaffer (1998).3
veals that inter-industry agreements are much more frequent than intra-industry agreements.
According to Chesnais (1988), 80% of Japanese inter-firm R&D cooperation involve firms
from different sectors. Licht (1994) presents similar evidence for six European countries. In
these countries, the most prevalent form of R&D cooperation includes either customers or
suppliers. Using German data from 1994, Harabi (1997) shows that 84% of all innovating
firms are engaged in R&D cooperation with customers or suppliers. This form of cooperation
is usually labeled vertical and distinguished from horizontal cooperation with firms operating
in the same industry (cf. Geroski, 1992). Von Hippel (1986) and VanderWerf (1992) present
case studies for the USA for innovations which are initiated by customers and suppliers, re-
spectively. Von Hippel explains customer driven innovations by ‘lead users’ who have better
capabilities to forecast their future needs or to fill their current needs than producers.
VanderWerf argues that suppliers of intermediate goods have an incentive to encourage
downstream innovation in order to increase their own demand. In both cases vertical coopera-
tion in R&D may increase the innovative success of participating firms. Geroski (1992, 1995)
points out that vertical R&D cooperation may be superior to horizontal agreements because
the latter may lead to collusive pricing for the products embodying the joint R&D efforts.
Probably the most prominent example for the importance of vertical R&D cooperation
between manufacturers and suppliers is the Japanese automotive industry. According to the
results of the large scale ‘International Motor Vehicle Program’ conducted at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology and summarized in the influential book The Machine that
Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990), the involvement of suppliers in early stages of the
product development process was one source of the Japanese car industry’s success. Womack
et al. (p. 150) provide convincing evidence that ‘[...] the Japanese assembler gains from the
increased willingness of its suppliers to come up with innovations and cost-saving suggestions
and to work collaboratively.’ This strategy of comprising the supplier’s technological knowl-
edge in the development process has become known under the label ‘Early Supplier Involve-
ment’ (ESI). Figures presented by Clark and Fujimoto (1991) underline the relative impor-
tance of the supplier’s contribution to the total development efforts devoted to a new car in
the Japanese car industry which amounts to 30% compared to 16% in Europe and 7% in the
USA. There is a considerable amount of evidence that Western car manufacturers have recog-
nized this potential source of innovative success and extended their ESI strategies in response
(cf. Lamming, 1993). Empirical evidence for the existence and significance of ESI strategies4
outside the automotive industry is given by Bidault et al. (1998) who present examples from
the electric appliances, consumer electronics and office equipment industries in the USA,
Europe and Japan.
Given this strand of empirical literature highlighting the importance of vertical R&D co-
operation, the limitation of the theoretical literature to one-industry oligopoly models ex-
plaining horizontal R&D cooperation between rivals is, at least, surprising. A first step to-
wards weakening this theoretical limitation is done by Steurs (1995) who introduces a second
industry into the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin framework which is related to the original in-
dustry by inter-industry R&D spillovers. He shows that inter-industry cooperation is more
likely to increase R&D investment, output and total welfare than intra-industry R&D coop-
eration. Moreover, the private incentives for inter-industry R&D cooperation usually exceed
the incentives to engage in intra-industry R&D arrangements unless inter-industry R&D spill-
overs are very small. While this model introduces inter-industry R&D cooperation, it can not
explain vertical R&D cooperation between suppliers, manufacturers and customers because
the two industries remain completely independent except for the presence of inter-industry
R&D spillovers.
This assumption is given up in a second line of literature which considers strategic R&D
investment in the presence of R&D spillovers between vertically related industries. Usually,
the R&D investments of the firms in the upstream market affect either the production process
or quality in the downstream market which encourages downstream demand and thereby the
demand for the intermediate good produced in the upstream market. Harhoff (1991) analyzes
a monopolist supplier reducing production costs of downstream firms, Peters (1995, 1997)
considers an upstream oligopoly reducing downstream production costs, and Harhoff (1996)
examines a monopolist supplier improving the product quality of downstream firms by strate-
gic R&D investment. However, none of these studies explicitly accounts for the possibility of
vertical R&D cooperation. Hence, a theoretical framework explaining a firm’s incentives to
engage in vertical R&D cooperation, e.g. by adopting ESI strategies, still seems to be missing.
This paper attempts to provide such a theoretical framework. To keep the theoretical
model tractable, the simplifying assumptions of the models introduced by D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and Steurs (1995) are maintained. In particular, two duopoly industries are
analyzed in which symmetric firms produce a homogeneous good. All firms can reduce their
constant marginal production costs with certainty by investing in R&D. These investments are5
affected by both intra- and inter-industry R&D spillovers. In addition, the two industries are
vertically related by the ‘successive oligopoly’ structure developed by Greenhut and Ohta
(1979) which is characterized by an upstream industry producing an intermediate good enter-
ing in fixed proportion the downstream firms’ production function. Their model has been
criticized (e.g. by Waterson, 1982) for its fixed proportion assumption which rules out factor
substitution in the downstream industry but is maintained here for its simplicity.
These assumptions lead to the following three-stage model: In the third stage downstream
firms engage in Cournot competition given the price of the intermediate good and R&D in-
vestments in both industries. Solving the third stage equilibrium total industry output for the
price of the intermediate good determines an inverse demand function for the second stage
Cournot competition of the upstream firms given the R&D investments in both industries. In
the first stage all firms simultaneously chose their R&D investments according to one of the
following four R&D scenarios: R&D competition, horizontal intra-downstream and intra-
upstream industry R&D cooperation, and vertical inter-industry R&D cooperation. It will be
shown that vertical R&D cooperation is usually the only stable equilibrium in the sense that
no firm has an incentive to chose any other R&D scenario.
In order to shed some light on the empirical content of the theoretical model, a small
econometric investigation is carried out using data from German manufacturing firms col-
lected in 1993. The empirical analysis focuses on the impact of intra- and inter-industry R&D
spillovers on the R&D intensity of firms. For this task, a new empirical measure of intra- and
inter-industry R&D spillovers is introduced which rests on the firms’ subjective evaluations
of the probability that innovations are imitated. The theory predicts a negative effect of intra-
industry spillovers and a positive effect of inter-industry spillovers on the R&D intensity for
all firms except for those engaged in a horizontal R&D cooperation for which both effects are
positive. The empirical analysis confirms the general sign pattern but can not reveal the ex-
ception concerning the firms participating in a horizontal R&D cooperation.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The output stages of the model are described in the
next section. Section 3 analyzes in detail the different first stage R&D scenarios and derives
the corresponding R&D investment levels. A comparison of the equilibrium values in R&D
and output and of the associated profits is relegated to Section 4 which also derives some em-
pirical implications of the theoretical model. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis and
Section 6 concludes.6
2.  The Output Stages
The model describes two vertically related duopolies: the two firms located in the upstream
industry produce an intermediate good which enters in fixed proportions the production func-
tion of the two firm’s located in the downstream industry. The price of the intermediate good
and the produced quantities of all firms are determined using the successive oligopoly struc-
ture proposed by Greenhut and Ohta (1979) in the second and third stage of the three-stage
model given the firms’ first stage R&D investments. R&D reduces with certainty the constant
marginal production costs of the firms in both industries
3 and is affected by intra- and inter-
industry R&D spillovers which are quantified by the two parameters  1 0 ≤ β ≤  and  1 0 ≤ δ ≤  in
accordance with the two-industry model suggested by Steurs (1995). Denoting the R&D in-
vestments of the downstream firms by  i u 2 ) , 1 i ( =  and the R&D investments of the upstream
firms by  i v 2 ) , 1 i ( = , the ‘effective R&D investment’ (cf. Kamien et al., 1992) which each
firm would have to invest alone in the absence of spillovers to achieve the same unit cost re-
duction is defined as
() 2 1 j i i v v u u U + δ + β + = ,) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =       (1)
() 2 1 j i i u u v v V + δ + β + = , ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =         (2)
in the downstream and upstream industry, respectively. Hence, the effective amount of R&D
consists of the firm’s own R&D investment, of the percentage β  of the firm’s competitor’s
R&D investment and of the fraction δ  of the total R&D efforts conducted in the vertically
related industry.
Upstream firms produce total homogeneous output  2 1 x x X + =  which is demanded by
downstream firms for a price p which will be determined endogenously. Given the fixed pro-
portion assumption, there is no loss of generality in setting the proportion parameter to one.
Hence, the total downstream output can be also written as  2 1 x x X + = . In accordance with
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) it is assumed that downstream firms face a linear
inverse demand function  bX a P − =  with  b / a X ≤ , 0 b , a > , in their market. Denoting the
marginal production costs in the downstream and upstream industry by c and d, respectively,
                                                
3  Thus, it is assumed that R&D efforts lead with certainty to cost reducing process innovations. Alternatively,
one could argue that product quality improving product innovations are the primary goal of the firms’ R&D
efforts. However, in an extension of the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin model covering both process and prod-
uct related R&D investment, Kaiser and Licht (1998) show that the theoretical implications for both types of
R&D are very similar.7
with  0 c > ,  0 d > ,  i U c ≥ ,  i V d ≥  and  0 d c a > − − , and assuming diminishing returns in R&D
measured by the parameter γ , the profit functions can be written as




i γ − + − − − = Π 2) , 1 i ( =                   (3)




i γ − + − = Π 2) , 1 i ( =                   (4)
where downstream and upstream firm are distinguished by the superscripts d and u. Imposing
p = 0 on (3) yields the profit function of a firm in the model of Steurs (1995) who considers
two independent industries. Imposing in addition  0 = δ  on (1) yields the profit function em-
ployed in the original D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) one-industry model.
Solving the model by means of backward induction the third stage of the model is solved
first in which downstream firms engage in Cournot competition given the price of the inter-
mediate good and the R&D investment levels in both industries. The first order conditions for
a maximum of 
d
i Π  with respect to  i x  have the form  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
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equilibrium. This condition also implies the existence and stability of the resulting Cournot
equilibrium (cf. Friedman, 1977, p. 71,  A7).
4 The third stage equilibrium output 
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i x  follows
from (4) by replacing  j x  with its reaction function
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The produced quantity of firm i unambiguously increases with its own R&D investment and
with the amount of R&D conducted by the firms located in the upstream industry. It decreases
with an increasing price of the intermediate good and with increasing R&D investments of the
competitor unless intra-industry R&D spillovers are sufficiently high ( 5 . 0 > β ).
                                                
4  These uniqueness, existence and stability statements hold under certain assumptions regarding the shapes of
the demand and cost functions (cf. Friedman, 1977, pp. 19-20, A1 and A2) which are satisfied in the linear
case analyzed here.8
The successive oligopoly structure suggested by Geenhut and Ohta (1979) relies on





III x x X + =  for the price p of the intermediate
good. Using this procedure the price of the intermediate good and thereby the inverse demand
function for the second stage Cournot game of the upstream firms is endogenously deter-
mined by the model. This is an advantage over the vertically related two industry model pro-
posed by Peters (1995, 1997) who also assumes a fixed proportions downstream production
function but treats the price of the intermediate good as exogenous.
 5 Proceeding as described
above the inverse demand function for the upstream industry results as
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Replacing p in the upstream profit functions 
u
i Π  ) 2 , 1 i ( =  given in (4) with (6) defines the
second stage objective functions of the upstream firms which also engage in Cournot compe-
tition. The first order conditions for profit maximization satisfy  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
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and define the two reaction functions of the upstream firms. The second order condition as
well as the sufficient condition for a unique Cournot equilibrium are again satisfied as can be
readily seen. Hence, a stable Cournot equilibrium exists which is characterized by the pro-
duced quantities  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
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+
δ + − β
+
δ + β −
+
− −
=                    (8)
obtained from replacing  j x  in (7) with its reaction function and solving for  i x . Similar to the
results established for the downstream industry, the produced quantity of upstream firm i in-
creases with its own R&D investment and the R&D efforts of the downstream industry and
decreases with the R&D investments of its competitor unless overall R&D spillovers are suf-









i x x +  determines the price of the intermediate
good in terms of R&D investment
                                                
5 Actually, Peters (1995) recommends weakening this exogeneity assumption in future research.9







d 2 c a
p +
δ − β +
− +
δ − β +
+
+ −
= ,   ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =                (9)
which decreases with increasing R&D investment of the upstream firms. Therefore the own
cost reducing effect of upstream R&D exceeds the effect of an increased demand for the in-
termediate good in the downstream industry due to the cost reducing inter-industry spillovers.
The price of the intermediate good increases with downstream R&D investment of down-
stream firms if () δ > β + 4 1.
Combining (5) with (9), the produced quantities of the downstream firms can be ex-
pressed exclusively in terms of R&D as  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
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+
δ + β −
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− −
= .               (10)
Due to the fixed (one to one) proportions assumption, the Cournot industry outputs are equal









II X x x x x X = + = + = . Substitution of (9) and (10) in
d
i Π ) 2 , 1 i ( =  defined in (3) yields the indirect profit function for the downstream firms which
is maximized in the first stage of the game with respect to R&D investments  i u . Corre-
spondingly, substituting (8) and (9) in 
u
i Π ) 2 , 1 i ( =  defined in (4) yields the indirect profit
function for the upstream firms which is maximized in the first stage of the game with respect
to R&D investments  i v.
3.  The R&D Stage
The indirect first stage profit functions in both industries can be expressed as  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
( ) ()
() () () ( ) [] , u b v v B A u A B 5 u B A 5 Z b
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where  () b 3 d c a Z − − = ,  () b 3 2 A δ + β − = ,  () b 3 1 2 B δ + − β = , and  b 2 γ = Γ  are intro-
duced for notational convenience. In the first stage of the game the firms maximize their
profits, either noncooperatively or cooperatively, with respect to R&D investments. An R&D
cooperation is defined by a maximization of the joined profit which is the sum of the profits10
of the cooperating firms. The output stages remain unaffected by an R&D cooperation which
means that cooperating firms within the same industry remain competitors in quantities. Four
R&D scenarios are distinguished in this section: R&D competition (NC), intra-downstream
industry R&D cooperation (DC), intra-upstream industry R&D cooperation (UC) and inter-
industry R&D cooperation (IC). The following paragraphs derive the corresponding symmet-
ric Nash equilibria in R&D. A comparison of the R&D outcomes and the associated quantities
and profits is relegated to Section 4.
6
R&D Competition (NC)
In the competitive scenario each firm independently maximizes its indirect profit function
with respect to its R&D investment. The first order condition for a maximum of the down-
stream profit function (11) can be written as  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
() () () () ()
() ( ) () . 0 v v B A B A 5 2                                                                       








= + + − +
− − + Γ − − + − =
∂
Π ∂
              (13)
R&D efforts conducted in the upstream industry always serve as a strategic complement (cf.
Bulow et al., 1985) for a downstream firm’s own R&D investment while the R&D investment
of the firm’s competitor is a strategic substitute unless overall R&D spillovers are sufficiently
high () 7 4 11 A B 5 > δ + β ⇔ > .
Here and in the following it is assumed that Γ  is sufficiently large to ensure that the sec-
ond order condition for profit maximization is satisfied. This assumption is also sufficient for
the existence of the Cournot equilibrium in R&D (cf. Friedman, 1977, p. 71). The sufficient
condition for uniqueness is  0 | v u | | u u | u
2











2 < ∂ ∂ Π ∂ + ∂ ∂ Π ∂ + ∂ Π ∂ ∑ =  and also
implies stability of the Cournot equilibrium in R&D (cf. Friedman, 1977, p. 71). This condi-
tion states that the firm’s own R&D investment effect on its reaction function dominates the
joined impact of the other firms’ R&D investments in absolute value. Unfortunately, this con-
dition is a complicated nonlinear function of the model parameters which is difficult to inter-
pret. The model shares this property with all studies within the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
framework. A detailed stability analysis of their original model is presented by Henriques
                                                
6 In contrast to the original contributions by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) and Steurs (1995),
welfare considerations are omitted in the current paper which focuses on the firms’ private incentives to en-
gage in R&D cooperation.11
(1990). Even in this basic model the stability condition is too complicated to derive simple
expressions for the spillover parameters as a function of the other exogenous model parame-
ters for which a stable equilibrium fails to exist. Therefore, Henriques refers to a simulation of
the model which assigns some numerical values to these other model parameters. In this ex-
ample she detects (small) unstable regions in the spillover parameter space. However, her
results depend crucially on the specific parameterization which prevents any further applica-
tion of her findings. Thus, in accordance with the existing extensions of the D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin model in which the stability issue is addressed (e.g. De Bondt and Veugelers,
1991, Kamien et al., 1992, Suzumura, 1992, Vonortas, 1994, and Steurs, 1995), the stability
condition is imposed without explaining its content in more detail.
The first order condition for a maximum of the upstream profit function (12) in the non-
cooperative R&D scenario can be written as  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
() () ( )0 u u B A A ABv 2 v   3 A 2 AZ 2
v




i = + + + + Γ − + =
∂
Π ∂
.                 (14)
The second order and stability conditions are assumed to hold. The strategic effects are simi-
lar to those in the downstream industry: downstream R&D efforts are strategic complements
and stimulate the upstream firm’s R&D investment while the competitors’ R&D investments
work as a strategic substitute unless overall spillovers are high () 1 2 0 B > δ + β ⇔ > . The
same condition is obtained by Steurs (1995) for two independent industries. It is less de-
manding than the condition for strategic complements within the downstream industry.
Focusing on a symmetric Nash equilibrium in R&D and therefore dropping the index, the
reaction functions (13) and (14) reduce to
() ( ) ( ) [] v u B A Z B A 5 u 9 + + + − = Γ ,               (15)
() ( ) [] v u B A Z A 2 v 9 + + + = Γ .
Solving (15) for the Nash equilibrium R&D levels in the noncooperative scenario leads to
7
()
() [] B A B A 7 9
Z B A 5
u
N
NC + − − Γ
−
= ,                      (16)
                                                
7  In all scenarios the optimal reaction functions have the form 9Γ u = a[Z + (A+B)(u+v)] and 9Γ v = b[Z +
(A+B)(u+v)] and imply the Nash equilibria u
 N = aZ/(9Γ  - (a+b)[A+B]) and v 
N=  bZ/(9Γ  - (a+b)[A+B]).12




NC + − − Γ
= .
In equilibrium, downstream firms conduct more R&D than upstream firms.
Horizontal R&D Cooperation in the Downstream Industry (DC)
The first cooperative R&D scenario is characterized by a horizontal R&D cooperation of the
two downstream firms while upstream firms remain competitors in R&D. Hence, an upstream






DC Π + Π = Π  over their respective R&D investment levels. The first order
condition satisfies  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
() ( ) ( ) ()
() () ( ) () . 0 v v B A 8 u A B 5 B A 5 2                                   









= + + + − − +
Γ − − + − + + =
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                 (17)
The second order and stability conditions are assumed to be satisfied. The signs of the strate-
gic effects are the same as in the noncooperative scenario. Imposing symmetric R&D invest-
ments within the two industries, the reaction function (17) can be written as
() () ( ) [] v u B A Z B A 4 u 9 + + + + = Γ               (18)
and implies, in combination with the upstream reaction function given in (15), the following
equilibrium R&D investments
()
() [] B A B 4 A 6 9
Z B A 4
u
N
DC + + − Γ
+
= ,                (19)




DC + + − Γ
= .
Again, the R&D efforts of the downstream firms exceed those of the upstream firms.
Horizontal R&D Cooperation in the Upstream Industry (UC)
In the second horizontal R&D cooperation scenario upstream firms cooperate in R&D while
downstream firms remain competitors. Hence, a downstream firm’s reaction function under






UC Π + Π = Π  over their respective R&D investment levels. The first order condi-
tion satisfies  ) j i   ; 2 , 1 j , i ( ≠ =
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              (20)
The second order and stability conditions are assumed to hold. The signs of the strategic ef-
fects are the same as in the noncooperative scenario. Imposing symmetric R&D investments
within the two industries, the reaction function (20) can be written as
() () ( ) [] v u B A Z B A 6 v 9 + + + + = Γ               (21)
and implies, in combination with the downstream reaction function given in (15), the follow-
ing equilibrium R&D investments
()
() [] B A B 5 A 11 9
Z B A 5
u
N
UC + + − Γ
−
= ,                      (22)
()
() [] B A B 5 A 11 9
Z B A 6
v
N
UC + + − Γ
+
= .
If overall R&D spillovers are sufficiently high, () ( ) 5 8 13 B A 5 B 6 A 6 > δ + β ⇔ − > + , up-
stream firms conduct more R&D than downstream firms.
Vertical R&D Cooperation (VC)
In the vertical R&D cooperation scenario one downstream firm cooperates with one upstream
firm. Because the two firms within both industries are completely symmetric they should be-
have symmetrically. Hence, two pairs of vertical R&D cooperation are analyzed. Assuming
that the two first and the two second firms in each industry cooperate






VC Π + Π = Π , 2) , 1 i ( = . The first order conditions for profit maximization
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8 This assumption is not restrictive because only symmetric Nash equilibria in R&D are derived.14
for a firm located in the downstream industry and
() ( ) () () ()
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for an upstream firm. The second order and stability conditions are assumed to be satisfied in
both industries. Unlike the competitive and the horizontal cooperation scenarios, the R&D
investments of the competing firm in the same industry always work as a strategic comple-
ment to each firm’s own R&D efforts. The same holds for the R&D investments of the firms
located in the other industry which was found in all R&D scenarios. However, the strategic
effects of the two firms in the vertically related industry have a different magnitude: the stra-
tegic effect of the cooperation partner exceeds the effect of the second firm in the vertically
related industry.
Imposing symmetry on the R&D investments within each industry, the reaction functions
(23) and (24) can be drastically simplified to
() ( ) ( ) [] v u B A Z B A 4 2 v 9 u 9 + + + + = Γ = Γ               (25)
which implies the following equilibrium R&D investments
()
() [] B A B 4 A 16 9





VC + + − Γ
+
= = .                 (26)
Hence, in contrast to the R&D scenarios considered before, the downstream and upstream
firms engaging in a vertical R&D cooperation invest the same amount of R&D.
4.  Comparing the R&D Scenarios
The Nash equilibrium values in R&D of the different R&D scenarios  () VC , UC , DC , NC S =
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Evaluating the second stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium output given in (8), or the third stage
equilibrium output given in (10), after introducing symmetry in R&D investment ( j i u u u = = ,
2 1 v v v = = ) yields the equilibrium quantities for the scenarios  () VC , UC , DC , NC S =  which
can be written as
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S b , a , b , a  given in the proceeding expressions can be obtained from the previous section
and are summarized again in the following table.
Table 1.
Description of the Equilibria









NC R&D competition 5 -1 2 0
DC Horizontal downstream industry R&D cooperation 4 4 2 0
UC Horizontal upstream industry R&D cooperation 5 -1 6 6
VC Vertical R&D cooperation 8 2 8 2
A ranking of the equilibrium values (27) – (30) over those scenarios which are under a firm’s
influence, i.e.  () VC , DC , NC S =  for downstream firms and  () VC , UC , NC S =  for upstream
firms, is of particular interest for a description of the firm’s production and R&D incentives.
A comparison of equilibrium quantities and R&D intensities between the different scenarios
is simple because either the numerator or the denominator is independent of
() VC , UC , DC , NC S = . A comparison of the R&D levels in two scenarios becomes difficult if
both numerator and denominator are larger in one of the two scenarios under consideration.16
Fortunately, this is only the case if one compares 
N
VC v  with 
N
UC v . This comparison depends on
the magnitude of b and γ  through Γ  while all other values can be ordered independent on the
magnitude of the exogenous parameters  γ , d , c , b , a . Summarizing some tedious but simple
calculations the following ranking of the equilibrium quantities, R&D investments and inten-
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The ranking of the profits in the different scenarios is also independent of the parameters
d , c , a  in Z but depends in a complicated way on the parameters b and γ  in Γ . Therefore,
following the approach proposed by Steurs (1995), the equilibrium profits are simulated by
varying the two spillover parameters  δ β ,  in steps of 0.1 over their parameter space [0,1] x
[0,1] for given values of the parameters  γ , d , c , b , a . This procedure is repeated for different
values of b and γ .
9 The simulations reveal that the profits in most cases display exactly the
same ranking as the quantities given above. This result implies that vertical inter-industry
R&D cooperation is usually the only stable equilibrium in this game in the sense that neither
downstream nor upstream firms have an incentive to choose any other scenario. If the spill-
over parameters are of a magnitude such that  () B 5 , B 2 A∈  is satisfied, then the output and
R&D investment levels associated with the stable vertical R&D cooperation scenario exceed
the respective levels of the other scenarios in both industries.
These results can be presented in a simple figure. The spillover parameter space pre-
sented in Figure 1 is divided into three regions by the two implicit functions  B 5 A =  and
B 2 A = . In this graph, the parameter space is spanned by the intra-industry spillover parame-
ter β  in the horizontal dimension and the inter-industry spillover parameter δ  in the vertical
dimension. The left dashed line in the figure corresponds to  B 5 A =  and the right line to
                                                
9 The simulations were performed using a Gauss program which is available upon request from the author.17
B 2 A = . The bright region between these two lines represents parameter constellations, e.g.
, 5 . 0 = δ = β  for which output, R&D investments and intensities are maximized in the vertical
R&D cooperation scenario and minimized in the noncooperative R&D scenario in both in-
dustries while the corresponding equilibrium values of the horizontal scenarios fall in be-
tween. The same ordering usually applies to the profits.
Figure 1. Regions of Cooperative R&D in the Spillover Parameter Space
   δ
                 β
Compared to the middle region,  () B 5 , B 2 A∈ , spillover parameter constellations in the shaded
region below the left line () B 5 A > , e.g.  , 25 . 0 = δ = β  only affect the downstream industry
equilibrium value ranking. In this region the noncooperative R&D scenario becomes more
attractive for downstream firms than the intra-industry cooperation scenario in the sense that
the associated profits are higher. However, both remain dominated by the profits achieved in
the vertical R&D scenario. The same ordering holds for the downstream firms R&D invest-
ment level. This can be explained by (17) which implies that the strategic effect of the com-
petitor’s R&D investment on the downstream firm’s reaction function becomes negative be-
low the left line if both firms cooperate in R&D. Hence, the competitor’s R&D investment
serves as a strategic substitute while it is a strategic complement in the middle region. The18
R&D intensities and the produced quantities of the downstream firms in the noncooperative
scenario also exceed their respective equilibrium values in the horizontal R&D cooperation
scenario if the overall R&D spillovers are sufficiently low.
Any combination of the spillover parameters β  and δ  falling in the shaded region above
the right line () B 2 A <  in Figure 1, e.g.  , 75 . 0 = δ = β  changes the equilibrium level ordering
in the upstream industry while the downstream industry ranking is the same as in the middle
region. However, only the ranking of the R&D investments and intensities of the upstream
firms is affected. The ordering of the produced quantities and of the profits remains un-
changed. While the relative magnitude of the R&D investment levels 
N
UC v  and 
N
VC v  is unclear
without further assumptions on Γ  as described above, the R&D intensity of the horizontal
intra-upstream cooperation scenario, 
N
UC v , exceeds the R&D intensity of the vertical coopera-
tion scenario, 
N
VC v,  i f   A B 2 > .
Empirical Implications
The subsequent empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between R&D spillovers and
R&D investments which has played a key role in both the theoretical and empirical literature
on R&D since its very beginning (e.g. Spence, 1984). The model outlined above enriches this
discussion because it provides a framework in which intra- and inter-industry spillovers are
distinguished and noncooperative and cooperative R&D outcomes are derived. Hence, the
model supplies explicit hypotheses about the impact of the two types of R&D spillovers on a
firm’s R&D engagement given the firm decides independently on R&D or jointly with a co-
operating firm operating on the same market or working in a vertical relationship. Focussing
on the R&D intensity as the R&D variable usually employed in empirical work, the following
marginal effects of the spillover parameters on the R&D intensity in the different cooperation
scenarios can be obtained from (29).






















































































































































It is obvious from (31) that increasing intra-industry spillovers reduce a firm’s incentive to
invest in R&D except for the case in which the firm is engaged in a horizontal intra-industry
R&D cooperation. In the latter case the firm’s R&D intensity increases with increasing intra-
industry R&D spillovers. This result holds symmetrically for both the downstream and up-
stream industry. The sign pattern for the impact of inter-industry spillovers on R&D intensi-
ties is also identical in both industries. Increasing inter-industry R&D spillovers always en-
courage a firm’s R&D intensity regardless on the underlying R&D scenario. These qualitative
hypotheses are subject to the empirical analysis in the next section.
5. Empirical Evidence
The scope of this section is limited to the empirical content of the qualitative theoretical re-
sults derived above. It is not intended to estimate structural form equations of the theoretical
model which would be too ambitious given the simplifying assumptions of the oligopoly
game (e.g. symmetry of firms). In accordance with Slade (1995), the static theoretical model
is used as a tool to ‘provide useful summary statistics concerning the outcomes of oligopolis-
tic interactions’ (p. 369). Reduced form R&D intensity equations are estimated to achieve
some insight if these outcomes are reflected in real data.
The empirical analysis is based on the first wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP) collected in 1993 by the Centre for European Economic Research in Mannheim in
charge of the German Ministry of Education, Research and Technology.
10 The data set covers
about 3,000 firms in the manufacturing, construction and service sectors. Excluding the latter
sector which is difficult to embed in the theoretical framework of the previous sections and
deleting missing values of the variables of interest described in the next paragraphs, a sample
of 1,758 firms remains for the regressions.
                                                
10  The questionnaire follows the guidelines for the standardization of innovation surveys proposed by OECD
(1997) in the so called ‘Oslo-Manual’. The first wave of the MIP serves as Germany's contribution to the
European Community Innovations Surveys (CIS; cf. Harhoff and Licht, 1994, for details).20
The first wave of the MIP contains extensive information about the R&D and innovation
activities of the firms. These include the R&D intensity defined as the ratio of R&D expendi-
tures to sales and indicators for horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation agreements. The
R&D intensity variable is censored because about 30% (= 546) of the firms included in the
final sample report an R&D intensity of zero. One might argue that these firms could be
omitted for the current purpose. However, 16 of these firms report a vertical R&D coopera-
tion as shown in Table 2.
Table 2.
Distribution of R&D Cooperation Scenarios





















Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), first wave 1993. Numbers in parentheses are row percentages.
The dominance of vertical R&D cooperation over horizontal R&D cooperation which has
initiated the theoretical model is readily seen from this table. It also becomes apparent that the
theoretical model can not explain this distribution of cooperation scenarios because the theory
implies that firms have no incentive to chose any other cooperation form than the vertical
R&D cooperation scenario. Therefore, additional reasons must exist to chose a particular
R&D scenario which are not covered by the model. It is assumed here that these reasons may
influence a firm’s cooperation choice but do not affect the magnitude of a firm’s R&D inten-
sity in a given scenario. Using this assumption, an empirical investigation of the theoretical
hypotheses derived above remains possible.
This investigation is rendered difficult by the impossibility to observe the two R&D
spillover parameters of interest, β  and δ . D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1990, p. 641) ad-
dress this issue as follows: ‘In terms of empirical verification [...], it is [...] crucial to extend
the analysis [...] of cooperative R&D by taking into account the main determinants that can
modify, at one moment of time, the level of the corresponding externalities.’ Empirical R&D
spillover variables which were constructed to meet this requirement are numerous and over-
viewed, e.g., by Griliches (1992), Nadiri (1993) and Inkmann and Pohlmeier (1995). Most
authors construct so called ‘R&D spillover pool’ variables which are defined as weighted21
sums of the R&D inputs of the firms entering the ‘pool’. Distinguishing intra- and inter-
industry R&D spillovers, the corresponding spillover pool variables for a firm i located in
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where i j≠  indicates the firms entering the respective pool.
 11 The weights ϖ ij should capture
the likelihood that knowledge is disseminated between the firms i and j. There are numerous
suggestions in the empirical literature on R&D spillovers for the specification of these
weights: Jaffe (1986) uses the correlation between the two vectors of patent applications in
different patent classes of the firms i and j. Inkmann and Pohlmeier (1995) extend this ap-
proach to the Euclidean distance of a large number of characteristics describing the techno-
logical distance between firms and industries.
Here, a new concept is introduced which rests on the firm’s subjective evaluation (π i, π j)
of the probability that innovations are imitated. If both firms i and j claim that innovations are
likely to be imitated then the leakage of innovative knowledge must be high or, in other
words, the magnitude of R&D spillovers must be large. The subjective evaluation of the dif-
fusion of innovative knowledge (π i, π j) is measured on scales from 1 (very low) to 5 (very
high). Therefore, an ad hoc specification of the weight ϖ ij which should capture the likeli-
hood of bilateral knowledge dissemination can be defined as
() ϖπ π ij i j =+ −11 0 / {} ∈ 01 09 . ,.., . .                        (34)
Using these weights, divided by the number of firms entering the respective R&D spillover
pool, and the R&D intensity of firm j in place of the R&D variable in (33), measures of intra-
and inter-industry knowledge flows are obtained which serve as approximations of β  and δ .
The firms are aggregated into 13 different sectors for the construction of the pool variables
which are shown in Table 3 below.
Kaiser (1999) performs plausibility checks for a number of R&D spillover variables us-
ing data on German manufacturing and service firms. He also considers the spillover pool
variables (33) in combination with the weights defined in (34). From the set of six empirical
                                                
11 An inherent problem of the methodology is that only firms in the sample enter the spillover pool while the
population counterparts are the variables of interests.22
R&D spillover variables included in his comparison, Kaiser recommends using either the one
introduced in (33)/(34) or the one suggested by Jaffe (1986) while the other four variables
may lead to counterintuitive results.
Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics ( n = 1758)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
R&D participation 0.6894 0.4629 0.0000 1.0000
R&D intensity 0.0297 0.0575 0.0000 0.5357
Intra-industry R&D spillovers (⋅ 10) 0.1318 0.0865 0.0047 0.4322
Inter-industry R&D spillovers (⋅ 10) 0.1298 0.0401 0.0722 0.2089
Horizontal R&D cooperation 0.0484 0.2146 0.0016 1.0000
Vertical R&D cooperation 0.1940 0.3955 0.0000 1.0000
Increasing demand expected 0.0518 0.2216 0.0000 1.0000
Number of employees (⋅ 10
-5) 0.1132 0.6936 0.0001 17.2447
Firm located in East Germany 0.3265 0.4691 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: mining, energy 0.0199 0.1397 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: food, textiles 0.0819 0.2743 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: wood, paper, printing 0.0830 0.2760 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: chemical products 0.0791 0.2699 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: rubber, plastics 0.0705 0.2561 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: mineral products 0.0336 0.1801 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: basic metals 0.0319 0.1757 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: metal products 0.1069 0.3091 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: machinery 0.2230 0.4164 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: electrical machinery 0.0933 0.2909 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: instruments 0.0745 0.2627 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: motor vehicles 0.0614 0.2402 0.0000 1.0000
Sector: construction 0.0410 0.1982 0.0000 1.0000
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), first wave 1993.
In order to make statements about the impact of the two spillover variables in the different
R&D cooperation scenarios in accordance with (31) and (32), the R&D intensity equation
contains interactions of the two spillover variables and the two cooperation dummies. De-
mand effects (described by the parameter Z in the theoretical model) are captured by a23
dummy variable which indicates an expected increasing demand for the three years following
the interview. Table 3 summarizes descriptive statistics of the estimation data.
The econometric specification accounts for the large fraction of firms reporting a zero
R&D intensity by using a selection equation as proposed, e.g., by Heckman (1979). The well-
known two-step estimator of Heckman’s selectivity model is implemented in terms of a Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) approach as suggested by Newey (1984) which auto-
matically generates a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the
parameter estimates. The moment functions for this GMM approach are given by Newey and
McFadden (1994, p. 2177). The specification of the selectivity model recently suggested by
Newey (1999) is considered as an alternative to Heckman’s specification. Newey’s specifica-
tion can also be estimated by the GMM approach to Heckman’s two-step estimator with the
only difference that the nonlinear correction term (the inverse of Mill’s ratio) is replaced with
the linear index of the selection equation. For identification reasons the linear index has to
contain at least one regressor which is not included among the set of explanatory variables of
the equation of interest. Such a linear correction term was proposed by Olsen (1980) who as-
sumes an uniform distribution for the error term in the selection equation. Contrary to Heck-
man’s specification, Olsen’s specification of the selectivity model yields consistent slope co-
efficient estimates despite misspecification of the error term distribution under conditions
derived by Newey. In addition to these selection models, ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mates are presented for the selected sample of firms reporting a positive R&D intensity be-
cause the selectivity correction term appears insignificant in one of the two selection models
(Olsen specification).
The size of the firm measured by the number of employees and an indicator for a location
in the Eastern part of Germany (former GDR) are used as additional regressors in the R&D
participation equation. The estimation results for the selection equation are not presented but
can be summarized as follows. A firm located in the Eastern part of Germany is less likely to
participate in R&D than a Western firm and larger firms are more likely to engage in R&D
than smaller firms. The 12 sector dummies turn out jointly significant while the demand indi-
cator turns out insignificant. Intra-industry R&D spillovers significantly reduce the probabil-
ity of observing a firm participating in R&D while inter-industry R&D spillovers work in the
opposite direction.24
Table 4.
Estimation Results for the R&D Intensity Equation
    Heckman    Newey-Olsen    OLS
Regressor estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value
Intercept   0.0415  3.89  0.0610  6.52  0.0608  6.51
Increasing demand expected  0.0393  3.20  0.0401  3.35  0.0402  3.35
Horizontal R&D cooperation  0.0513  1.66  0.0408  1.32  0.0404  1.32
Vertical R&D cooperation  0.0026  0.16 -0.0071 -0.44 -0.0073 -0.46
Intra-industry R&D spillovers -0.3885 -3.74 -0.2809 -3.11 -0.2799 -3.10
  ⋅  Horizontal R&D cooperation -0.0239 -0.40 -0.0208 -0.35 -0.0213 -0.36
  ⋅  Vertical R&D cooperation  0.0047  0.11  0.0300  0.67  0.0300  0.67
Inter-industry R&D spillovers 0.3566  3.31  0.2000  2.31  0.1986  2.31
  ⋅  Horizontal R&D cooperation -0.2960 -1.60 -0.2463 -1.35 -0.2445  -1.35
  ⋅  Vertical R&D cooperation  0.0126  0.12  0.0280  0.26 0.0290 0.27
Selectivity correction term 0.0495  3.22 -0.0002 -0.36 --- ---
Tests of joint significance
2 χ (df) p-value
2 χ (df) p-value
2 χ (df) p-value
Slope parameters: (df = 22) 134.00 0.00 231.16 0.00 225.55 0.00
Sector dummies: (df = 12) 36.04 0.00 37.69 0.00 37.76 0.00
Note: The data source is the first wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), 1993. The columns labeled
Heckman and Newey-Olsen contain GMM estimates of the selectivity models suggested by these authors. The
OLS estimates are computed on the sample of firms reporting a positive R&D intensity using the heteroskedas-
ticity-consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix suggested by White (1980).
Table 4 contains the estimation results for the R&D intensity equation which includes in ad-
dition a set of 12 sector dummies for which no results are presented except for the Wald sta-
tistic indicating the joint significance of these variables in all three specifications. The esti-
mation results are similar for all three estimators. The GMM estimates for the Newey-Olsen
selection model are very close to the OLS estimates. The demand indicator turns out positive
significant in keeping with the theoretical impact of the parameter Z. Intra-industry R&D
spillovers have a strong negative impact on the firms’ R&D intensities while inter-industry
R&D spillovers significantly encourage R&D efforts. Both results correspond to the general
sign pattern derived from the theoretical model in (31) and (32). However, the predicted posi-
tive effect of intra-industry R&D spillovers on the R&D intensities of firms engaged in a
horizontal R&D cooperation is not found. The dummy variables indicating a horizontal or
vertical R&D cooperation as well as the interactions of these dummies with the R&D spill-
over variables turn out insignificant which prohibits any further interpretation. They remain25
insignificant in more parsimonious specifications of the R&D intensity equation which in-
clude only one of the two cooperation forms or exclude the cooperation specific shift pa-
rameters.
6. Conclusions
This paper has introduced an extension of the oligopoly models suggested by D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) and Steurs (1995) in order to explain both horizontal and vertical R&D
cooperation between firms in the presence of intra- and inter-industry R&D spillovers. The
model is a first attempt to incorporate the possibility of vertical R&D cooperation between
upstream and downstream firms into the usual two-stage oligopoly models used to analyze
horizontal R&D cooperation between firms operating on the same product market. For this
purpose the usual second stage Cournot game is replaced with the successive oligopoly
structure considered by Greenhut and Ohta (1979) which describes two vertically related in-
dustries and provides an endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate good.
Firms in both industries invest in R&D in order to reduce their production costs. Distinguish-
ing R&D competition and horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation between firms it turns out
that vertical R&D cooperation usually maximizes the profits of the participating firms. Hence,
the theoretical framework can explain vertical R&D agreements which clearly outnumber
horizontal R&D agreements in practice. An empirical investigation of the impact of R&D
spillovers on a firms’ R&D intensity confirms the respective theoretically predicted negative
and positive signs of intra- and inter-industry spillovers for the average firm but can not re-
veal the positive impact of intra-industry spillovers on the R&D intensity of firms engaged in
a horizontal R&D cooperation.26
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